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EMPLOYMENT LAW-ANTIDISCRIMNATION-HEADING TOWARD
FEDERAL PROTECTION FOR SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION?
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that your boss approaches you and states that you are fired be-
cause you are a woman. Now imagine a supervisor approaches you and
says that you will not receive the promotion because the company requires a
less macho, less aggressive female for the position. Imagine that a cowork-
er of the opposite sex persistently makes sexually suggestive comments
about you and sometimes touches you inappropriately. Finally, consider
your boss of the opposite sex implies that, if you do not accept his sexual
advances, you will probably lose your job. If you happen to find yourself in
a similar situation you can file suit in federal court and you will likely pre-
vail against your employer for employment discrimination-if you can
prove that you were discriminated against because of your sex.'
Now imagine that you learn that you were fired because you are gay or
sexually nonconforming. In this case, you have no recourse in federal court
against your employer.2 Further imagine that you learn that your supervisor
did not give you a promotion because he thinks you are gay. Again, you
have no recourse in federal court. Now consider that your boss of the same
sex tells you that if you do not have sexual relations with him then you are
fired. Once again, you have no recourse in federal court. Finally, envision
that your coworkers of the same sex constantly make sexually suggestive
comments toward you and, even though you are not gay, they touch you in
an unwelcomed sexual manner.
You are not entitled to federal relief under any of these circumstances
because, according to the federal courts, you were not discriminated against
because of your sex but rather because of your sexual orientation. Sexual
1. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (a landmark employ-
ment discrimination case in which the Court recognized the "gender stereotyping" cause of
action); Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (an example of a successful quid
pro quo sexual harassment cause of action). See also Christy M. Hanley, Comment, A "Con-
structive" Compromise: Using the Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Work Environment Classifica-
tions to Adjudicate Constructive Discharge Sexual Harassment Cases, 73 U. CrN. L. REV.
259, 284-86 (2004) (discussing quid pro quo as it pertains to sexual harassment claims).
2. Federal court venues are advantageous in employment discrimination cases because
the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial and the coveted punitive damages. Civil Rights Act of
1964 § 703, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000). Title VII was enacted in 1964
and took effect in July of 1965. It was expanded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
creates compensatory and punitive damage remedies for claims of intentional discrimination.
The 1991 Act was signed into law on November 21, 1991, and the expanded remedies apply
to all conduct occurring after that date.
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orientation is a characteristic that is currently not protected from employ-
ment discrimination under federal law.3 As a result, you will assuredly be
unable to retain an attorney willing to represent you in federal court because
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") does not include pro-
tection for discrimination based on an individual's sexual orientation.4
Even if you can retain an attorney to file suit under Title VII, the court will
probably dismiss your case; nearly all employment discrimination claims
with a hint of sexual orientation are thrown out of federal court.
This note discusses the phenomenon that sexually nonconforming em-
ployees-such as gays, lesbians, transsexuals, and transgender persons-are
subjected to unequal treatment by the federal courts and the Supreme Court
of the United States when the employee brings an employment discrimina-
tion claim under Title VII.6  This unequal treatment occurs because, al-
though courts generally ignore the sexual orientation of a heterosexual
claimant, they become overly consumed with the sexual orientation of a
homosexual plaintiff.7 Such precedential decisions permit federal courts to
repeatedly use the scapegoat that "sexual orientation is not covered under
Title VII," 8 even though the employer may have also discriminated against
an employee on the basis of a protected trait, like race or religion.9 Thus,
federal judges usually dismiss claims brought by gays and lesbians even
though their employer may have actually discriminated against them. ° The
original purpose of passing Title VII, however, was to deter employment
3. See, e.g., Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 69 (8th Cir.
1989).
4. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -2000e-17 (2000)). See also Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597
F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that discharge for homosexuality is not prohibited by
Title VII).
5. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).
The district court originally dismissed the claim based on the fact that the plaintiff believed
the harassment occurred because he was gay. Id. at 1064. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (the court did not mention the
sexual orientation of the presumed heterosexual claimant; it was irrelevant and assumed);
Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005) (the court seemed to become
consumed with the lesbian claimant's sexual orientation when analyzing her Title VII sex
discrimination claim).
8. See, e.g., Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005);
Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 260-61 (3d Cir. 2001); Wrightson v.
Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996); Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co.,
77 F.3d 745, 751-52 (4th Cir. 1996).
9. See discussion of plural-type claims infra Part IE.
10. See, e.g., Dawson, 398 F.3d 211 (2005) (lesbian plaintiff was discriminated against




discrimination in order to eliminate it altogether." By dismissing employ-
ment discrimination claims and denying an employee relief because of sex-
ual orientation, federal courts further frustrate Congress's primary objective
in passing Title VII.
12
To counterbalance the lack of federal protection for sexually noncon-
forming employees, many states have enacted statutes that prohibit discrim-
ination based on sexual orientation, 3 and many organizations continue
moving toward protecting all persons from discrimination in the
workplace. 14 The cumulative effect of this movement toward relief for sex-
ual orientation discrimination may inevitably lead to its protection under
Title VII, and such inclusion will ultimately result in working toward the
actual goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace. 15
This note begins with the history of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, including a discussion of relevant cases that have impacted and shaped
the jurisprudence of employment discrimination since the passing of the
Act.'6  In particular, this note will discuss the Supreme Court's treatment
of sexual orientation as it relates to discrimination claims brought by em-
ployees under Title VII. 17 This note then explains the two types of sexual
orientation claims that employees generally assert under Title VII and how
the courts typically dismiss such claims. 18 Next, this note will explore fur-
ther discrimination against gays and lesbians and the impact it has on the
movement toward relieving such discrimination. 19 Finally, this note con-
cludes by focusing on possible solutions to resolve the unequal treatment of
11. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -2000e-17 (2000)). See also Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998).
12. Courts maintain that Congress's intent is clear because it has repeatedly rejected
legislation that would have extended Title VII to cover sexual orientation. The current
Congress, however, is not necessarily recognizing the core purpose of passing Title VII in
the first place. See Bibby, 260 F.3d at 261 (3d Cir. 2001).
13. Twenty-four states prohibit public employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation, and seventeen states prohibit private employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation. See Barbara Osborne, "No Drinking, No Drugs, No Lesbians ": Sexual Orienta-
tion Discrimination in Intercollegiate Athletics, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 481, 489-90 (2007).
14. See Lambda Legal, http://www.lambdalegal.com (last visited Aug. 11, 2009); Na-
tional Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Nondiscrimination,
http://www.thetaskforce.org/issues/nondiscrimination (last visited Aug. 11, 2009).
15. The stated purpose of Title VII. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -2000e-17 (2000)).
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part 1I.D.
18. See infra Part II.E.
19. See infra Part II.F.
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straight claimants over gay and lesbian claimants, thus, fulfilling the pur-




When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it became an un-
lawful employment practice for "an employer ... to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. 21 As codified, the statute does not define what "sex"
means, nor does it discuss sexual orientation.22 In order to prevail on a
standard sex discrimination claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove
each element of the statute--a daunting task for many employees.23 In or-
der to have a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the plaintiff
must prove: that the employer took an adverse employment action against
the employee;24 that the employer took the employment action because of a
protected trait;25 and that such trait is the employee's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.26 The "because of' provision is the causation ele-
ment where the plaintiff must show, for example, that she was fired because
20. See infra Part III.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining what "because of sex" means, which appears limited
to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions).
23. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
24. An adverse employment action correlates to the statutory language "with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment .... ." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(l) (2000). See, e.g., Anduze v. Fla. Atl. Univ., 151 F. App'x 875, 879 (11 th Cir.
2005). An adverse employment action only includes adverse actions from the employer,
such as getting fired or laid-off, not receiving a promotion, not getting hired or re-hired, a
hostile work environment, revoking a pension plan, eliminating insurance benefits, reduction
of wages, etc. It generally does not include trivial employment actions, such as getting
switched to a smaller office, receiving a slower computer, or having the refrigerator in the
office kitchen removed (even if the trivial action was because of race, for instance). See
Storey v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding no evidence of
discriminatory animus and no adverse employment action when an employee was terminated
for refusing to remove confederate flag stickers from his lunch box and pickup truck).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). "Because of' is the causation element-a difficult hur-
dle for many plaintiffs. See David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation
Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1709-14 (2002).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
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of her biological sex and not because she was insubordinate, repetitively
late, or the like.27
B. The Legislative History of Title VII
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act with the in-
tent to eliminate discrimination in the employment sector.28 Title VII partly
provides that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any in-
dividual on the basis of the employee's sex. 29 There exists, however, mi-
nimal legislative history of what "sex" actually means under the statute.
30
This has contributed to more controversy and confusion over what Congress
intended to protect when "sex" was included in the language of the Act.
What is known, however, is that merely days before the House of Rep-
resentatives was prepared to vote on the Civil Rights Act, the chairman of
the House Rules Committee (Howard Smith) proposed an amendment to
add the trait "sex" to the list of prohibited bases for unlawful employment
discrimination.32 Some believe that the main reason for the amendment was
to provide equal opportunities for women.33 It was widely known, however,
that Smith was a strong advocate against the entire bill, and the amendment
was his last-minute attempt to block it completely.34 Nonetheless, the bill
became law and now the courts are left to construe the interpretation of
"sex" as enacted in Title VII.31
Because of the lack of legislative history, courts construe "sex" nar-
rowly and rule favorably only if discrimination claims are purely based on
36sex, such as the typical case of male-to-female sexual harassment. As a
27. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1988) ("When... an employ-
er considers both gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, that decision
was 'because of sex .... ').
28. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -2000e-17 (2000)).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
30. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
31. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977) (dis-
cussing numerous cases and theories surrounding the intent behind "sex" as included in the
language of Title VII).
32. See Nicole Anzuoni, Gender Non-Conformists Under Title VII: A Confusing Juri-
sprudence in Need of a Legislative Remedy, 3 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 871, 880-81 (2002). See
also Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that the "sex
amendment was the gambit of a congressman seeking to scuttle adoption of the Civil Rights
Act.").
33. See, e.g., Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1974); Rosenfeld
v. S. Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971).
34. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 986-87 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
35. See Ulane, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The ploy failed and sex discrimi-
nation was abruptly added to the statute's prohibition against race discrimination.").
36. See, e.g., EEOC v. V & J Foods, Inc., 507 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2007).
2009]
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result, when an individual brings a sex discrimination claim under Title VII
and the individual's sexual orientation is mentioned (or perhaps later be-
comes an issue), courts have repeatedly dismissed such cases because sex-
ual orientation is simply not a protected trait under the plain language of
Title VII.
37
C. Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation
It is important to distinguish and resolve any misconceptions about the
differences between sex, gender, and sexual orientation. Federal courts
generally consider "sex" to mean individual biological and physical charac-
teristics, which are simply a person's maleness or femaleness. 38 Additional-
ly, sex also means "the physical attributes of bodies, specifically the exter-
nal genitalia. 39 Gender, on the other hand, is considered to include indi-
vidual cultural expressions of femininity and masculinity. 40 Gender is fur-
ther defined as an individual's social identity, as related or unrelated to sex,
encompassing culturally traditional masculine or feminine characteristics or
traits.4 The physical and social distinctions between sex and gender are
often confused when the terms are used as equivalents, generally because of
carelessness or, perhaps, because of litigation strategy.42 Courts, nonethe-
less, use the two terms interchangeably when discussing the actual sex of a
plaintiff, further muddling the distinction in the context of a claim brought
under Title VII.
43
Contrary to its common cultural usage, the terms "sexual orientation"
do not merely identify whether one is heterosexual or homosexual; rather,
the term denotes the apparent or actual inclinations of sexual or affectional
interests or desires among humans toward members of the same sex, the
37. See Simonton v. Runyon, 225 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming lower court's
dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim under Title VII; the complain alleged
harassment because of plaintiffs sexual orientation).
38. See Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted) ("Congress intended the term 'sex' to mean 'biological male or biological female,'
and not one's sexuality or sexual orientation.").
39. See Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex,
Gender & Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 161, 164 (1996).
40. See Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
379, 379 (1999).
41. See Francine T. Bazluke & Jeffrey J. Nolan, "Because of Sex": The Evolving Legal
Riddle of Sexual vs. Gender Identity, 32 J.C. & U.L. 361, 367 (2006).
42. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the
Conflation of "Sex," "Gender, " and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and So-
ciety, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1, 21-22 (1995).
43. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-45 (1989) (using the
terms "gender" and "sex" interchangeably).
[Vol. 32
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other sex, or both sexes." Sexual orientation typically includes, but is not
necessarily limited to, individuals who may be heterosexual, homosexual,
bisexual, transgender,45 or transsexual.46 The courts, however, typically
perceive the terms "sexual orientation" to include only those persons who
may be homosexual.47 As previously defined, though, every individual has
a sexual orientation, whether it is interest or desire in a person of the same
sex, the other sex, or in both sexes.4
Although the distinctions between sex, gender, and sexual orientation
seem straightforward, the law of sex discrimination has reflected a great
deal of confusion among the differences and legal effects of the terms.n As
noted above, sex discrimination case law tends to use sex and gender as
interchangeable concepts to refer to whether an employee is male or fe-
male.50 For example, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,51 the Supreme Court
referred to sex and gender as the same concept throughout the opinion as it
pertained to the plaintiff's femaleness.5 2 Treatment of the terms as equiva-
lents is possibly one reason for the confusion of what sex and gender should
mean when analyzing a sex discrimination claim.
D. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Title VH
1. Because of Sex
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson53 was the first sexual harassment case
brought before the Supreme Court under Title VII.54 In this groundbreaking
44. See Valdes, supra note 42, at 23.
45. Transgender has been defined to include "gender variant people who have not nec-
essarily sought to alter their bodies but nonetheless feel a disjunction between their biologi-
cally and socially gendered selves." Anna Kirkland, Victorious Transsexuals in the Cour-
troom: A Challengefor Feminist Legal Theory, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 2 (2003).
46. See id. (defining transexuals as people who so identify themselves and who seek to
alter their physiological gender status through surgery or hormones in order to bring it into
line with their social and emotional gender status).
47. See Erin E. Goodsell, Toward Real Workplace Equality: Nonsubordination and
Title VII Sex-Stereotyping Jurisprudence, 23 WIs. J.L. GENDER & Soc'Y 41, 46 (2008).
48. See Valdes, supra note 42, at 23.
49. See Schwartz, supra note 25, at 1706.
50. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-45 (1989) (using the
terms "gender" and "sex" interchangeably); see also Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating
Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1995) (suggesting that the Court's common usage of
"gender" in sex discrimination cases results largely from Ginsburg's efforts to substitute the
word gender in order to "ward off distracting [i.e., sexual] associations" with the word
"sex").
51. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
52. Id. at 241-45.
53. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
2009]
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case, the Court expanded the meaning of Title VII's language and estab-
lished that sexual harassment that creates a hostile work environment is
another form of unlawful employment discrimination. 55 The plaintiff, Mi-
chelle Vinson, was a federal bank employee that prevailed on a sexual ha-
rassment claim against the bank and her boss, Sidney Taylor.56 Taylor hired
Vinson when she was nineteen-years-old as a teller-trainee; he treated her in
a fatherly way and did not attempt sexual advances toward her during the
training period. 7 Soon after her training was complete, Taylor took Vinson
out to dinner and invited her to a motel to have sex.58 Vinson declined the
proposal, but claimed that she was afraid of losing her job if she continued
to refuse Taylor's advances; she eventually agreed, however, to have sexual
relations with him.59 She asserted that Taylor made repeated demands for
sexual favors at her workplace, and she estimated that over the following
several years they had intercourse about forty to fifty times, sometimes at
work.6 ° Vinson also alleged that Taylor raped her on many occasions.6'
Approximately four years after being hired, and soon after Michelle Vinson
started dating another man, she notified Taylor that she was taking sick
leave for an indefinite period; the bank later discharged her for excessive
use of that leave.62
The Court held that Taylor created a hostile work environment through
sexual advances and encounters with Vinson, which amounted to sexual
discrimination because Vinson's "conditions of employment"63 were signif-
icantly worse than those of her coworkers because of her sex.64 In its rea-
soning, the Court relied upon the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion guidelines and concluded that Taylor created a hostile work environ-
ment that amounted to unlawful discrimination under the language of Title
VII.
65
The terms "sexual harassment" do not appear in the language of Title
VII, but, as seen in Vinson, the Court read the terms into the statute by rul-
54. See Theresa M. Beiner, Sexy Dressing Revisited. Does Target Dress Play a Part in
Sexual Harassment Cases?, 14 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 125, 127 (2007).
55. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
56. Id. at 60-62.
57. Id. at 60.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Vinson testified that Taylor "fondled her in front of other employees, followed
her into the women's restroom when she went there alone, exposed himself to her, and even
forcibly raped her on several occasions." Id.
61. Meritor, 477 U.S. at60.
62. Id.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(I)(A)(i) (2000).
64. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.
65. Id. at 65. The Court further noted that employees have the right to work in an envi-
ronment free from sexual harassment under Title VII. Id.
[Vol. 32
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ing that employers are prohibited from creating a hostile work environment
where the harassment is severe and pervasive enough to affect the em-
ployee's "conditions of employment." 66 Although that case was strictly a
male-to-female sexual harassment case, it is important to note that at no
point in its decision did the Court discuss the sexual orientation of either
Taylor or Vinson, whether heterosexual or homosexual, their sexual orienta-
tions were assumed as heterosexual; it was a nonissue.
67
2. Stereotyping Based on Sex/Gender
In the landmark case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,68 the Supreme
Court expanded the meaning of sex under Title VII and held that sex in-
cludes harassment directed at an employee when the employee fails to con-
form to traditional stereotypes of being a male or female. 9 Price Water-
house involved a woman named Ann Hopkins-a senior manager at the
large accounting firm-who brought suit against the partners for discrimi-
nating against her by refusing to reconsider her for partnership. 70 The part-
ners originally showcased Hopkins's "[two-year] effort to secure a [twenty-
five] million [dollar] contract with the Department of State, labeling it 'an
outstanding performance' and one that Hopkins carried out 'virtually at the
partner level."' 7' At the same time, however, some partners judged her for
being "overly aggressive" and "macho," suggesting that she "overcompen-
sated for being a woman. 72 One partner advised Hopkins that she should
"walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry" if she wanted to improve
her chances at partnership.73 The Supreme Court held that Hopkins was not
necessarily discriminated against because of her sex, but that she was un-
lawfully discriminated against because she failed to conform to the charac-
teristics expected of her as a woman.74 As a result of such a holding, em-
ployees that are discriminated against for not conforming to a male or fe-
66. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (holding
that for sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive "to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment")).
67. See Meritor, 477 U.S. 59.
68. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
69. Id. at 250 (propounding a new cause of action under Title VII known as gender
stereotyping).
70. Id. at 231-32. Approximately one percent of the partners at the firm were women.
Id. at 233.
71. Id. at 233.
72. Id. at 234-35.
73. Id. at 235.
74. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
20091
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male stereotype can bring a Title VII claim for being discriminated against
75"because of' his or her sex.
In Price Waterhouse, the Court expanded Title VII's meaning of "sex"
to include, not only a person's sex at birth, but also masculine or feminine
behavior, appearance, and other characteristics.76 That particular aspect of
the holding in Price Waterhouse has not registered well with lower courts,
however, which continue to maintain that the traditional meaning of dis-
crimination "because of sex" is limited to a person's actual, biological sex at
birth."
3. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
Approximately one decade later, the Supreme Court further expanded
the scope of sex discrimination in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.78 when it held that same-sex sexual harassment was cognizable under
Title VII. 79 In that case, a male employee named Joseph Oncale-working
with an all-male crew on an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico 80-alleged that he
was discriminated against because of his sex, violating his Title VII rights.
8'
Joseph Oncale claimed that his coworkers and his supervisor threatened him
with rape, and he claimed on one occasion that he was held by one em-
ployee while a second employee placed his penis on Oncale's neck. 82 He
further alleged that he was restrained by a co-worker in the shower while
another coworker forced a bar of soap into his anus. 83 Oncale stated that he
was harassed because he was effeminate and because he failed to meet the
stereotypical behavior and characteristics of what a man should be.84 On-
cale continually asserted that he was a married heterosexual male with two
children.85 Thus, because the parties' sexual orientation was never an issue
75. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 57 (1986).
76. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
77. See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e decline in
behalf of the Congress to judicially expand the definition of sex as used in Title VII beyond
its common and traditional interpretation.").
78. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
79. Id. at 79.
80. Id. at 77.
81. Id.
82. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir.
1996).
83. Id.
84. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 27-28, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
85. In his Supreme Court brief, Oncale wrote:
Can there be any treatment more demeaning and objectively harassing to a mar-
ried, heterosexual male with two children than to be subjected to sexual taunts,
sexual touching and physical, sexual assault by other men with whom he must
[Vol. 32
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in this case, the Court did not view Oncale's claim as one of sexual orienta-
tion but rather as a sexual harassment claim.8 6 The Court unanimously held
that Title VII prohibits this type of same-sex sexual harassment because it
was "objectively offensive as to alter the 'conditions' of the victim's em-
ployment."
8 7
Gay rights activists deemed the Supreme Court's holding in Oncale as
a victory for homosexuals because, in their view, the case set precedent for
gays and lesbians to bring same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title
VII. 8 But the holding in Oncale fell short of such realization. 89 The Court
did, however, provide three scenarios in which a plaintiff might prevail on a
claim of same-sex sexual discrimination.9" None of the scenarios included a
situation in which the victim is homosexual or transgender or otherwise
implicate the victim's nonconforming sexual orientation. 9' Consequently,
the lower courts are left to determine whether same-sex sexual harassment
also encompasses harassment based on the victim's sexual orientation.92
E. Sexual Orientation Claims
1. Two Types of Claims
Employees generally bring two types of sexual orientation discrimina-
tion claims. The first claim is what this note refers to as a "singular" claim,
when a plaintiff asserts that his employer discriminated against him solely
because of his sexual orientation.93 Clearly, under the current language of
Title VII sexual orientation is not included as a protected trait, and claims
work in a closely confined work space on the Outer Continental Shelf of the
United States?
Id.
86. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
87. Id. at 81.
88. See Nailah A. Jaffree, Note, Halfway Out of the Closet: Oncale's Limitations in
Protecting Homosexual Victims of Sex Discrimination, 54 FLA. L. REv. 799, 817 (2002)
(citing Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Supreme Court Says Same-Sex Ha-
rassment Illegal 4 (Mar. 4, 1998) (available at http://www.aclu.org/news/n030498b.html).
89. See Jaffree, supra note 88, at 817.
90. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.
91. The scenarios include: (I) if the harasser was homosexual and presumably moti-
vated by sexual desire; (2) the harasser used sex-specific terms indicating hostility to women
in the workplace; and (3) the harasser treated men and women differently in the workplace.
Id.
92. See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 259 (3d Cir. 2001)
(holding that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action under Title VII when he alleged
that he was sexually harassed because of his sexual orientation).
93. See Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1133 (10th Cir. 2005) (reject-
ing discrimination claim based on plaintiffs heterosexuality because an employee's sexual
orientation is not protected by Title VII).
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based solely upon sexual orientation discrimination are repeatedly dis-
missed in federal court.94
The second claim a plaintiff might bring is what this note refers to as a
"plural" claim, which is an employment discrimination claim premised
upon two or more character identity traits.95 A plural claim, for example, is
when an employee brings a Title VII discrimination claim against the em-
ployer for getting fired because of two or more identity traits, such as race
and sexual orientation. 96 The employee in that case has an actionable claim
for being fired because of his race, but he does not have an actionable claim
for getting fired because he is gay, for example.97 But, as stated above, a
federal court is likely to dismiss such a claim because it becomes overly
consumed with the fact that the claimant is gay.98 An even more challeng-
ing plural claim is one in which a female employee brings a claim for not
getting promoted because she is female and lesbian. 99 Because of the inter-
connectedness of being female (her sex) and being lesbian (her sexual orien-
tation), she will likely have a difficult time convincing most federal courts
that she was actually discriminated against because of her sex and not be-
cause of her sexual orientation.100 When an employee brings a plural-type
claim in federal court, the courts commonly assert that the plaintiff is at-
tempting to "bootstrap" protection from sexual orientation discrimination
onto a cognizable claim under Title VH. 0 1
Currently, the only way a plaintiff might have a chance to succeed on a
plural-type sex discrimination claim is under a gender-stereotyping cause of
action,1 2 which is premised upon the theory that the employee was discri-
94. See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
95. See, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir 2005) (a case of
employment discrimination because of gender and sexual orientation); Devon W. Carbado &
Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 702 (2001) (discuss-
ing the theory of intersectionality, which is equivalent to the concept of "plural" claims).
96. See Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as "Catch 22 ": Why Identity Perfor-
mance Demands Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REv. 299, 309-10
(2006) (discussing the treatment of claims brought under Title VII when two or more charac-
ter identity traits intersect).
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (protected traits are limited to race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin).
98. See supra note 7.
99. See Dawson, 398 F.3d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 2005). Dawson, the plaintiff, claimed that
she suffered discrimination on the basis of sex, sex stereotyping, and sexual orientation in
violation of federal law, but her claims were nonetheless denied.
100. See id.; Kristin M. Bovalino, How the Effeminate Male Can Maximize His Odds of
Winning Title VII Litigation, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1117, 1134 (2003) (counseling "gay
plaintiffs bringing claims under Title VII [to] emphasize the gender stereotyping theory and
de-emphasize any connection the discrimination has to homosexuality.").
101. See Dawson, 398 F.3d at 216 (2d Cir. 2005); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38
(2d Cir. 2000).
102. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a transgender
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minated against because of her gender nonconformity. 103 Few courts recog-
nize this theory, however, and thus far have only recognized it in the context
of transsexuals that were discriminated against because of their gender non-
conformity and not because of their sexual orientation.,
0 4
2. "Bootstrapping" Identity Traits
As mentioned above, many courts deny plural-type sex discrimination
claims when, as the courts have concluded, the plaintiff had attempted to
bootstrap protection for sexual orientation discrimination that is otherwise
not afforded by Title VII.10 5 This happened to be the case in Dawson v.
Bumble & Bumble. 0 6 Dawn Dawson was an assistant at a prestigious, high-
end hair salon in Manhattan. 10 7 She claimed that she was denied a promo-
tion and was fired for being a gender-nonconforming lesbian woman.
10 8
Her coworkers made offensive comments to her such as "[she] needed to
have sex with a man," and that she was "wearing her sexuality like a cos-
tume." Dawson further alleged that two stylists wanted to fire her because
of her "dyke" attitude. 0 9 In a final meeting with Dawson, the salon manag-
er informed her that she was terminated because she seemed unhappy and
because of the way she dressed and wore her hair." 0 The manager further
stated that she could not send Dawson to any salon location outside of New
York City because people would not understand her and because she would
"frighten them.""' The Second Circuit ultimately held that "Dawson's
claims of sex stereotyping [were] derive[d] not from gender stereotypes, but
rather from stereotypes based on sexual orientation, and thus are not cog-
nizable under Title VII. ' ," 2 The court recognized, like other courts, that a
city fire department employee, who was born male and subsequently was diagnosed with
gender identity disorder, can bring an actionable sex discrimination claim under Title VII).
103. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (propounding the
gender stereotyping cause of action, which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an employee because he fails to conform to stereotypical expectations of his gender).
104. See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005); Smith v. City
of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C.
2006).
105. See, e.g., Dawson, 398 F.3d 211.
106. 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005).
107. Id. at213.
108. See id. Dawson described herself as a lesbian female who does not conform to




!11. Id. at 215-16.
112. Dawson, 398 F.3d at 216.
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gender stereotyping claim cannot be used to "bootstrap protection for sexual
orientation into Title VII."" 13
Just like Dawson, a homosexual plaintiff who alleges an actionable
discrimination claim based on sex will generally be denied relief because
the courts accuse plaintiffs of bringing such claims as an attempt to boot-
strap an additional discrimination claim based on sexual orientation.1
4
Thus, when those employees have suffered some form of actual discrimina-
tion-whether because of a protected trait or sexual orientation or both-
they are continuously denied the benefits of Title VII protection that their
heterosexual counterparts enjoy. 1 5 It is important to remember the intended
purpose of Title VII: to eliminate employment discrimination."
16
F. Other Discrimination
Additional instances of discrimination exist within employment law
and certain areas of society that contribute toward prohibiting discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation. It has been hypothesized that gay and les-
bian employees suffer a wage gap as a form of employment discrimina-
tion. 1 7 Studies have shown that gay men face a wage penalty relative to
heterosexual men, while lesbian women enjoy a wage advantage relative to
heterosexual women.118 In a recent study, Antecol, Jong, and Steinberg-
er"19 found that "lesbian women earned more than heterosexual women ir-
respective of marital status, while gay men earned less than their married
heterosexual counterparts but more than their cohabitating heterosexual
counterparts." 20
Sheila Hatami and David Zwerin discuss the growing sexual orienta-
tion discrimination in the field of education, and they opine that educators
should reflect their population in certain characteristics.' 21 They argue that
113. Id. at 218 (quoting Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d. Cir. 2000)).
114. See, e.g., Dawson, 398 F.3d at 211; Simonton, 232 F.3d at 38; Bovalino, supra note
100, at 1134 (counseling "gay plaintiffs bringing claims under Title VII [to] emphasize the
gender stereotyping theory and de-emphasize any connection the discrimination has to ho-
mosexuality.").
115. See supra note 93.
116. See supra note 11.
117. See Heather Antecol, Anneke Jong & Michael Steinberger, The Sexual Orientation
Wage Gap: The Role of Occupational Sorting and Human Capital, 61 INDuS. & LAn. REL.
REV. 518, 518-21 (2008) (citing numerous studies and papers on the sexual orientation wage
gap).
118. See id. The magnitude of the penalty or advantage varies across studies.
119. Id. at 518.
120. Id.
121. Sheila Hatami & David Zwerin, Educating the Masses: Expanding Title VII to In-




Title VII has been improperly interpreted by the federal courts and needs to
be re-examined and expanded to include sexual orientation discrimination in
order to protect the fundamental rights of all citizens, particularly in the
field of education.
22
A somewhat related issue is sexual orientation discrimination expe-
rienced by collegiate athletes. In 1996 at Pennsylvania State University,
basketball coach Maureen Portland had an anti-gay policy that was charac-
terized as "no drinking, no drugs, no lesbians.' ' 123 As a result, Jennifer Har-
ris-a promising young athlete' 24 -was cut from the team after her sopho-
more year because the coach suspected that she was a lesbian that was
brainwashing her teammates.1 25 Harris subsequently filed suit against the
coach, seeking relief for a pattern and practice of discrimination on the basis
of race, gender, and sexual orientation. 26 The parties were unable to re-
solve the dispute in a court ordered mediation session; they eventually set-
tled the case in February of 2007. The settlement remains confidential.127
Same-sex marriage has recently become a popular political and moral
debate among society, scholars, and throughout organizations in many
states. 128 This is possibly because "opposition to marriage for same-sex
couples is part of a socially conservative philosophy that holds that sexual
activity is only appropriate within (heterosexual) marriage.' 29 Many plain-
tiffs in same sex-marriage cases argue that the holding and reasoning of
Loving v. Virginia130 (and other Supreme Court marriage cases)' 3' support
122. Id. at 315.
123. Osborne, supra note 13, at 481. See also Claire Williams, Sexual Orientation Ha-
rassment and Discrimination: Legal Protection for Student-Athletes, 17 J. LEGAL ASPECTS
SPORT 253, 253 (2007).
124. Jennifer Harris was a highly talented high school basketball player garnering recog-
nition as an All-American by McDonald's, WBCA, Parade Magazine, and Nike. See Os-
borne, supra note 13, at 481.
125. Id. at 482 (citing Harris' First Amended Complaint at 13, Harris v. Portland, No.
1:05-CV-2648, 2006 WL 1317125 (M.D. Pa. 2006)). See Penn State Reprimands, Fines
Coach Portland, Associated Press (Apr. 18, 2006),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncw/news/story?id=2412730 (last visited Aug. 11, 2009). Harris
asserts she is not gay; the discrimination and harassment lawsuit was focused on her per-
ceived sexuality. Id.
126. Williams, supra note 123, at 253-54.
127. Id. at 254.
128. See, e.g., Helen M. Alvard, The Turn Toward the Self in the Law of Marriage &
Family: Same-Sex Marriage & Its Predecessors, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 135, 186-91
(2004); William C. Duncan, In Whose Best Interests: Sexual Orientation and Adoption Law,
31 CAP. U. L. REV. 787 (2003); Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Pa-
renting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 835-40 (1997).
129. Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex
Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 461, 463
(2007).
130. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) In Loving, the Supreme Court held that the right to marry is fun-
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the notion that the right to marry is a fundamental right, requiring a higher
standard of appellate review when determining the constitutionality of laws
against same-sex marriage.' 32 Most courts disagree and, through applica-
tion of a lower standard of review, have concluded that there is no substan-
tive due process violation by denying same-sex marriage. 33 This is mostly
because case law stands for the proposition that the fundamental right to
marry is limited to the traditional definition of the institution of marriage,
requiring spouses to be of different sexes.
134
This topic requires more discussion beyond the scope of this article,
but it is briefly discussed because the social pressure of the issue of gay
marriage may inevitably be a factor that could lead the Supreme Court or
Congress to consider inclusion of federal sexual orientation protection in the
workplace.
III. PROPOSAL
A. Freedom from Discrimination
Proponents of including sexual orientation as a protected class under
Title VII have argued that freedom from any form of discrimination is a
natural right inherent to all individuals, 135 especially in a country premised
upon safeguarding individual rights and ensuring freedom from oppression.
Although Congress passed the groundbreaking Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 in an attempt to eliminate discrimination in the workplace,
136
sexually nonconforming employees continue to suffer discrimination with-
out any recourse in federal court. 13 7 Opponents of such inclusion, however,
argue that under a plain reading of Title VII, sexual orientation is not a pro-
damental and struck down a state law banning interracial marriage as unconstitutional.
131. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding that prisoners enjoy a con-
stitutional right to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384, 406 (1978) (holding that
individuals who owe child support cannot be denied the opportunity to marry because the
right to marry is fundamental under the United States Constitution).
132. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 619 (Md. 2007) (stating that gay liti-
gants rely on Loving, inter alia); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 210 (N.J. 2006) (noting that
plaintiffs rely on Loving "to support their claim that the right to same-sex marriage is funda-
mental").
133. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993).
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., John G. Culhane, Review of Sexual Orientation and Human Rights, 16
WISC. INT'L. L.J. 579, 581 (1998).
136. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
137. See, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 215 (2d Cir. 2005) (the
plaintiff suffered discrimination, but her case was dismissed).
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tected class and is not actionable in federal court. 138 Which side has the
more sound argument? Opponents of including sexual orientation in Title
VII might have the more logical argument because the statute clearly does
not include or even mention sexual orientation. But which side is right in
terms of promoting equality and eliminating discrimination? Which side is
in accordance with the purpose of Title VII? Regardless of which side you
happen to align with, the answer lies in the fact that a certain class of em-
ployees is subjected to open, hostile employment discrimination, and the
federal courts are continually denying relief to those employees because of
their sexual preferences.
A corollary situation, for example, would be if Congress passed a bill
that made it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee
because of obesity to eliminate weight discrimination in the workplace.
Then over the following decades, the courts interpret the statute properly
and made it unlawful to discriminate because of obesity, but then deny relief
for discrimination because of anorexia (even though both, of course, would
be a form of weight discrimination). Although this example seems academ-
ic and improbable, it illustrates what is happening in the federal courts with
regard to Title VII: deny relief to some and allow it for others, even though
actual employment discrimination has occurred. It is borderline ignorant,
and perhaps even inadvertently hypocritical, for federal courts to disregard
the overarching purpose of enacting Title VII and to deny gay and lesbian
employees relief from employment discrimination.
This article proposes that one of three events must occur in order to
provide proper relief to employees discriminated against because of their
sexual orientation. The first (and maybe the most probable) would be for
Congress to pass legislation that prohibits discrimination based on sexual
orientation. The second event would be if the Supreme Court read the cha-
racteristic of a person's sexual orientation into the language of Title VII, as
either encompassed within the statutory definition of sex or as read into
other language of the statute. 139 Third, and possibly the least politically
controversial, would be if the Supreme Court (and federal courts) disre-
garded the employee's sexual orientation altogether when analyzing an em-
ployment discrimination claim. 140 This last solution could be difficult for
138. The definition of "because of sex" at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-k (2000) does not include a
reference to sexual orientation.
139. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (reading "sexual harass-
ment" into the statutory language of "conditions of employment."). See supra Part II.D. 1.
140. See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that the sexual orientation of the male plaintiff in a male-to-male sexual harassment case was
irrelevant because the sexual orientation of a female victim in the typical sexual harassment
case is always irrelevant).
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courts to implement, however, because of the interconnectedness of sex,
gender, and sexual orientation.
Although it may be implausible to predict whether any of the three
events would occur, or whether any solution is more likely to occur than the
others, each option is worth discussing in order to determine whether the
courts (and society) could fulfill the ultimate goal of Title VII: to eliminate
discrimination in the workplace.
1. Legislation
Although federal law does not currently afford relief for discrimination
based on sexual orientation, the District of Columbia and twenty states now
have laws that prohibit discrimination because of a person's sexual orienta-
tion.141 Such prohibition is generally in areas of employment, housing, or
public accommodations. 142 At least in those states, a plaintiff can bring a
state claim against the employer for discrimination based on gender or sex-
ual orientation, which is obviously not a colorable claim under federal
141. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ore-
gon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. Seven
states prohibit discrimination only on the basis of sexual orientation. The remaining thirteen
states cover sexual orientation and gender identity. Directory M, Sexual Orientation Dis-
crimination in the Workplace,
http://articles.directorym.com/SexualOrientationDiscrimination-in-theWorkplace--
a951701.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2009). See also Nancy J. Knauer, LGBT Elder Law:
Toward Equity In Aging, 32 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 1, 35 n. 231 (2009):
[tiwelve states and the District of Columbia have laws prohibiting discrimination on account
of sexual orientation and gender identity. These states are: California, Colorado, Illinois,
Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Washington. Eight additional states prohibit discrimination on account of sexual orientation.
These states are: Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New York, and Wisconsin.
142. Id. For example, a New York statute provides the following:
"[it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (a) For an employer or an em-
ployee or agent thereof, because of the actual or perceived age, race, creed, col-
or, national origin, gender, disability, marital status, partnership status, sexual
orientation or alienage or citizenship status of any person, to refuse to hire or
employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such person or to discrimi-
nate against such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment."
NYC ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (1) (a)-(d) (emphasis added). The New York Code defines gend-
er to include "actual or perceived sex and shall also include a person's gender identity,
self-image, appearance, behavior or expression, whether or not that gender identity, self-
image, appearance, behavior or expression is different from that traditionally associated with




law. 143 The result is a lack of national uniformity in this area of employ-
ment law, allowing for continued discrimination in the remaining thirty
states with no relief to gay and lesbian employees in state or federal courts.
Since 1994, Congress has made repeated unsuccessful attempts to pass
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA). 144 The bill is an effort
to prohibit discrimination because of an employee's sexual orientation.
145
ENDA defines the scope of sexual orientation to include homosexuality,
heterosexuality, or bisexuality. 46 The bill, however, only covers intentional
discrimination claims directed toward an individual employee's sexual
orientation, but it does not cover unintentional (or hidden) discrimination
that would affect an entire class of employees on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion. 147 The original bill failed to pass the Senate in 1996 and was put back
on the calendar in 2002; it has yet to pass through Congress. 148 Even if the
bill were to eventually become federal law, it would likely be subjected to
the "congruence and proportionality" test spelled-out in City of Boerne v.
Flores,149 which could inevitably defeat the law if a more conservative court
heard the matter.
Considering the current political landscape and controversy of expand-
ing gay rights, it seems unlikely that Congress will pass the bill in the near
future. Nonetheless, it is possible that, with a new administration in the
White House and the cooperation of more liberal-minded members of Con-
gress, sexual orientation discrimination may eventually become an unlawful
employment practice through legislation such as ENDA.
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
144. Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. (2007).
145. See id.
146. See id. § 3(a)(9).
147. See id. § 4(g). "Intentional" discrimination is commonly referred to as a "disparate
treatment," when the employer intentionally discriminated only against the employee be-
cause of a protected trait. Conversely, "unintentional" discrimination is commonly referred
to as a "disparate impact," when the employer has a facially-neutral employment pattern or
practice that affects an entire class of individuals because of a protected trait (e.g., an em-
ployment policy that requires new employees to possess a high school diploma to work pick-
ing apples). The requirement is unlawful because it is not related to business necessity and
because it generally has a disparate impact on certain groups of minorities (which must be
proved by statistics). See, e.g., Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs, 965 F. Supp. 741 (D. Md. 1997).
148. See the proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2001, S. 1284, 107th
Cong. (2001). The current version of the bill is available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlc I 10/h2015_ih.xml.
149. 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (imposing the requirement of"congruence and proportio-




2. Reading Sexual Orientation into Title VII
The Supreme Court sometimes reads new meaning into existing statu-
tory language, particularly when it is consistent with congressional intent
and purpose. 150 For example, as discussed above with Hopkins, the Court
expanded the meaning of sex under Title VII to include not only a person's
sex at birth but also masculine or feminine behavior, appearance, and other
characteristics. 51 This language does not appear in the definition of "sex"
under Title VII, yet the Court likely included such language because there
was actual employment discrimination. 52 The Court, therefore, seemed to
take the liberty of expanding the definition of the term "sex" in order to
prevent the inequitable result of employment discrimination that was not
covered by federal law at that time.
It is more evident in the Vinson decision that the Court is willing to
read certain language into Title VII.' 53 The Court in Vinson read the terms
"sexual harassment" into the language of Title VII ("conditions of employ-
ment") because the employer's conduct affected an employee's conditions
of employment through his .continual sexual contact with the employee.
54
Under a plain reading of Title VII, it is unmistakable that Congress did not
include, or perhaps even contemplate, whether sexual harassment was un-
lawful when it drafted the Act.155 But just as in Dawson, the Court in Vin-
son-twenty-two years after the Act was passed-incorporated additional
unlawful conduct into the language of Title VII that did not originally ap-
pear in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.156
Dawson and Vinson are merely two examples of the Court's willing-
ness to expand statutory definitions and incorporate additional, unlawful
discriminatory conduct under Title VII that was otherwise not originally
drafted in the statute. The federal courts' staunch approach to repeatedly
holding that Title VII does not cover a person's sexual orientation is logical-
ly flawed because an individual's sex or gender identity becomes unmistak-
ably intertwined with that person's sexuality, sexual behavior, and sexual
preference. In many situations, it may be nearly impossible to determine,
150. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
151. See id. at 228.
152. See id.
153. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); supra Part 11.D.1.
154. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (providing that it is an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his conditions of employment because of such individual's sex).
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 241 (1964).
156. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
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for example, whether an employee was discriminated against because she is
lesbian, female, or both.
Federal courts continue to use the strict definition of sex as meaning a
person's maleness or femaleness, furthering the unequal treatment and dis-
crimination in the workplace, which is exactly what Congress wanted to
remedy by enacting Title VII. The question remains whether the courts will
ever incorporate sexual orientation into the definition of "sex," or perhaps,
whether they would broaden the reading of Title VII to encompass any dis-
crimination that is connected to or intersects with a person's sex or gender.
3. Disregarding Sexual Orientation Altogether
A less controversial solution might be for the courts to disregard a
plaintiffs sexual orientation when analyzing a claim for employment dis-
crimination. When a gay plaintiff's sexual orientation is either alluded to or
discussed in the complaint or answer, most federal courts will generally
grant an employer's motion for summary judgment.'57 But when a straight
plaintiff brings an employment discrimination claim, the plaintiff's sexual
orientation is irrelevant and almost never an issue. 158 This is likely because
society and the courts typically presume that an employee is straight unless
that person claims (or appears) to not conform to sexual orientation stereo-
types. The solution to this particular unequal treatment is to disregard a
plaintiff's sexual orientation altogether.
Such solution could be difficult to implement in certain situations be-
cause, when an employee is fired because she is a female and a lesbian, it is
nearly impossible to disregard her sexual orientation because the claim is
partially premised upon, and completely connected to, her sexual orienta-
tion. It seems as though another step is needed here, such as making the
argument (as previously mentioned) that her sexual orientation should
somehow be covered under Title VII because of the interconnectedness of
her sex and her lesbianism. The catch twenty-two is that, as soon as an em-
ployee argues that her sexual orientation should be covered by federal law,
she allows her orientation to become the issue, and federal courts would
likely dismiss her case (which of course clears the docket of a potentially
heated controversial matter).
In sexual harassment cases, however, it appears much easier to disre-
gard a plaintiffs sexual orientation because the key element required in
proving a sexual harassment claim is to show that the harassment was se-
157. See, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2005).
158. See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. 57 (not discussing the harasser's or the victim's sexual
orientation). But see Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (9th Cir.
2002) (disregarding the sexual orientation of the victim and the harasser).
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vere and pervasive enough to affect conditions of employment. 159 Fortu-
nately, some courts follow the holding that the sexual orientation of the ha-
rasser and the harassed is immaterial (but only in the context of sexual ha-
rassment). 16  In a same-sex sexual harassment case, for example, the Se-
venth Circuit in Doe v. City of Belleville16 1 seemed to disregard the sexual
orientation of the employees and harassers when it noted that, "[t]he fact
that the ... harassers are not gay-a fact that some courts view as disposi-
tive-is, in our view, immaterial. 162  In Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel,
Inc., 163another same-sex harassment case, the Ninth Circuit disregarded the
sexual orientation of the plaintiff by holding that the plaintiff's sexual orien-
tation was irrelevant because the harassment was "sexual in nature.' 64 The
court further noted that the plaintiff's sexual orientation neither provides nor
precludes a cause of action. 165 Although ignoring a plaintiffs sexual orien-
tation is apparently feasible with sexual harassment cases, it seems equally
infeasible with other sex discrimination claims brought under Title VII be-
cause of the nature of the cause of action and because a person's sex is
sometimes inseparable from that person's sexual orientation in litigation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Recent court acceptance of hearing discrimination claims brought by
sexually nonconforming claimants is an indicator of the federal courts pos-
sibly expanding Title VII's coverage to protect gay and lesbian employees.
We are surrounded by additional indicators that individual states, private
companies, and society have embarked on a movement to protect citizens
from all forms of employment discrimination, regardless of sexual behavior
or preference. The cumulative effect of this movement toward relief for
sexual orientation discrimination may inevitably lead to the inclusion of
sexual orientation protection under Title VII.
Of the three proposed solutions, it seems unlikely that any will occur in
the near future because of the resulting political and societal fall-out of ex-
159. See Rene, 305 F.3d at 1063-64.
160. See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566 (7th Cir. 1997). But see McWil-
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downer Offshore Svcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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164. See id. at 1066.
165. Id. at 1063-64.
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panding gay rights. But that does not mean that we should abandon optim-
ism and perseverance to prevent the unequal application of the law and in-
justice against employees as outlined in this note. And with such continued
unequal treatment in employment discrimination law, something must occur
if we desire to strive for adherence to the original intent of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act: eliminating discrimination in the workplace.
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